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RESOLUTION OF THE SURPRISE EXAM PARADOX
TAHL NOWIK
Abstract. We present a resolution of the celebrated “Surprise Exam Paradox”. We argue that
if the surprise exam story is analyzed using the exact same meaning of the notion of “surprise”
as is dictated by the story itself, then no paradox arises.
The “Surprise Exam Paradox” has drawn great interest over the years. An overview appears
in [C], with extensive bibliography which is being updated in its arXiv version. I first describe
the surprise exam story, as a play in three acts.
1. The surprise exam story
ACT 1: Teacher in class: “On one of the days of next week, I will give you a surprise exam!”
ACT 2: Student A: “If the exam is not given before Friday, then Friday morning before
school, we would know that the exam must be on that day, and so it would not be a surprise.
Since the teacher has announced that the exam will be a surprise, he will not give it on Friday.
Student B: “I now imagine Thursday morning. Since we have already established that the
exam will not be on Friday, if the exam is not given before Thursday, then Thursday morning
before school, we would know that the exam must be on that day, and so it would not be a
surprise. Since the teacher has announced that the exam will be a surprise, he will not give it
on Thursday either.
Narrator: “... and so the students go on, analyzing the previous day, and the one preceding
that, until the first day of the week, and are thus convinced that the teacher’s surprise exam
cannot take place on any day of the week...”
ACT 3: On Wednesday the teacher announces: “Today we have an exam!”
Narrator: “... and the students were so very surprised...”
Date: November 30, 2014.
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2. Apparent paradox, and its resolution
The seeming paradox that this story suggests, is that though the students have established
that a surprise exam cannot take place, they are surprised on Wednesday after all, as the narrator
announces in Act 3. I however will argue, that the narrator’s notion of “surprise” appearing in
Act 3 is different from the students’ notion of surprise appearing in Act 2 when deducing that
no surprise exam can take place. I will establish that if the narrator would have held the precise
same meaning of the notion of surprise as used by the students in Act 2, then in Act 3 he would
say: “and as expected, the students were not surprised!”, and so, no paradox would arise.
We ask then, how is the notion of surprise used by the students in Act 2 in their deduction
that no surprise exam can take place. In the students’ argument in Act 2, the notion of surprise
is used in exactly one crucial step of the inductive argument. When for a given day they realize
that in the morning of that day, before school, they will be able to prove to themselves that
the exam must take place on that day, then they feel that an exam under such circumstance is
not a surprise, and so they deduce that the exam cannot take place on that day, and another
step of the induction is completed. So we see that in fact the notion “not being surprised” or
“unsurprised” appears, and it is used precisely as follows:
Proposition 2.1. The notion of “not being surprised” is used by the students in Act 2 in the
following way: If in the morning of the exam, before school, we can provide ourselves with a
proof that the exam must take place on that day, then an exam on that day is not a surprise.
At first sight this seems as an acceptable meaning for the notion of unsurprised, and we do
not question it when following the students’ arguments in Act 2. I will however argue, that this
meaning of unsurprised is quite different from our natural notion which is represented by the
narrator in Act 3. To establish this claim, I will formulate some clarifications of Proposition 2.1.
Clarification 2.2. In the eyes of the students the following holds: Even if in addition to the
proof that the exam must take place today, we can also provide ourselves with a proof that the
exam cannot take place today, we still consider an exam given today not to be a surprise.
How do we know this? We know this because we see it happening in Act 2, though it is slightly
hidden by differences of time in the story. The students imagine themselves in the future, on
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Wednesday morning before school, formulating the proof that the exam must take place on that
day, and then, using their notion of unsurprised as appears in Proposition 2.1, and the teacher’s
announcement of Act 1, they infer in the present time of Act 2 that the exam cannot take place
on Wednesday. Since we see that our students are able to imagine themselves making the first
deduction (“exam must take place”) on Wednesday, they can also imagine themselves making
their second, contradicting deduction (“exam cannot take place”) on Wednesday. In fact, when
they imagine Tuesday morning, which is one step ahead in the induction, they indeed imagine
themselves realizing that there cannot be an exam on Wednesday. So, there is no reason why
they shouldn’t imagine themselves making that same deduction on Wednesday. We see however
that this does not deter them from feeling that an exam on Wednesday would not be a surprise,
since we see they continue untroubled with their inductive argument. This establishes the claim
of Clarification 2.2.
We go further in demonstrating the extent to which our students hold the notion of unsurprised
as formulated in Proposition 2.1.
Clarification 2.3. In the students eyes the following holds: Even if in several previous mornings
we have provided ourselves with a proof that the exam must take place on that given day, and
then have seen that it has in fact not taken place, we are not discouraged. That is, if today we
may again provide ourselves with a proof that the exam must take place today, we still feel that
an exam taking place today is not a surprise.
And how do we know this? In the same way that we have established Clarification 2.2. During
Act 2, the students can imagine themselves proving to themselves every morning until Tuesday
that the exam must take place on that given day, which is something they in fact do during Act
2 (in reverse order), and then imagine the exam not taking place on each of these days, which
is also a fact that they happen to establish in Act 2. And so they know that when Wednesday
morning arrives, and they will formulate their proof that the exam must take place on that day,
they will have already experienced several failures of their predictions. We see again that this
does not deter them from feeling that an exam on that day is not a surprise, and the induction
process proceeds. This establishes the claim of Clarification 2.3.
We can go on and point to other peculiarities of the notion of unsurprised appearing in Propo-
sition 2.1, and then formulate a corresponding clarification that says that even if this peculiarity
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presents itself, the students continue to hold their precise view of unsurprised appearing in
Proposition 2.1. The argument will be similar to the argument appearing twice above. What-
ever peculiarity we note, can also be noted by the students. Since we see they have continued
confidently with their inductive process, we see that in their eyes, any such peculiarity does not
invalidate their notion of unsurprised appearing in Proposition 2.1.
Now, in view of our understanding of the students’ notion of unsurprised, we can move on
to analyze Act 3. If the narrator would use precisely the same notion of unsurprised as held
by the students, he would announce in Act 3 that the students were not surprised, since their
notion of unsurprised does indeed hold when the teacher announces the exam on Wednesday.
On Wednesday morning they can indeed provide themselves with a proof that the exam must
take place that day (the proof described in Act 2), and so according to their particular notion
of unsurprised formulated in Proposition 2.1, and further clarified in Clarifications 2.2 and 2.3,
they will indeed not be surprised.
In conclusion, the source of the apparent paradox is a crucial difference between our intuitive
notion of surprise, and that of the students appearing in Act 2. We are puzzled by this story
since when following the arguments of Act 2 we are willing to accept the notion of surprise used
by the students, not noticing its peculiarities, and so we also accept their conclusion, that no
surprise exam can take place. But then in Act 3, we slip back, together with the narrator, to
some different, more common, presumably less peculiar notion of surprise, according to which
an exam on Wednesday is a surprise. Since these are two different notions of surprise, their
contradicting conclusions are not a paradox.
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